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Abstract: We study the dynamics of individual beliefs and information aggregation when agents
communicate via a social network. We provide a general framework of social learning that captures
the interactive effects of three main factors on the structure of individual beliefs resulting from such a
dynamic process; that is historical factors—prior beliefs, learning mechanisms—rational and bounded-
rational learning, and the topology of communication structure governing information exchange. More
specifically, we provide conditions under which heterogeneity and consensus prevail. We then establish
conditions on the structures of the communication network, prior beliefs and private information for
public beliefs to correctly aggregate decentralized information. The speed of learning is also established,
but most importantly, its implications on efficient information aggregation.
Keywords: Learning, social networks, public beliefs, speed of learning, information ag-
gregation.
JEL classification: C70, D83, D85.
1. Introduction
Individual beliefs play a significant role in determining public opinions and decisions made under
uncertainty, both of which in turn shape social welfare. For example the level of heterogeneity in
beliefs about government policies such as public health and social integration initiatives affects their
implementation. Decision making under uncertainty is a ubiquitous problem in economics and social
settings. Examples include consumer decisions on a brand choice; adoption of agricultural products
and information technologies; investment as well as legislative decisions among others. Our goal in
this paper is to provide a comprehensive yet fundamental framework for characterizing the evolution
of individual beliefs through social learning, and to establish conditions under which the resulting
public beliefs correctly and efficiently aggregate decentralized information.
There are mainly three factors that influence the evolution of individual beliefs through social
learning; historical factors—prior beliefs, the learning mechanism (the manner in which individuals
incorporate new information into their beliefs)—-rational or bounded-rational learning, and the
∗Corresponding author: Opolot D. C., Maastricht University—UNU-MERIT, Keizer Karelplein 19, 6211 TC Maas-
tricht, The Netherlands, (opolot@merit.unu.edu), Tel. +31 433884440, Fax +31 433884499.
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topology of communication structure governing information exchange. To this end we construct a
comprehensive theoretical model that is fundamental enough to capture the main properties and
general enough to enable us compare and contrast the properties of beliefs resulting from rational
and bounded-rational learning. There exists a true state of nature unknown to all agents about
which they update their beliefs. Agents possess heterogeneous prior beliefs that are not necessarily
correlated to the true state of nature. Each agent receives private information that is informative
about the true state of nature, and in turn updates their prior belief. The resulting private beliefs
are then simultaneously communicated (or simply announced) to the immediate neighbors.1 After
observing the neighbors’ announcements, each agent incorporates the communicated beliefs into
their private beliefs either by deducing the associated private signal in the case of rational learning,
or by taking the weighted average of the announcements in the case of bounded-rational learning.
The communication and learning process continues until none of the agents has new information
to learn from the announcements of his neighbors, in which case their beliefs become “local public
information”. To differentiate private beliefs from beliefs that result at the end of the learning
process, we refer to the later as public beliefs since they become public information at least to the
first-order neighbors.
Unlike previous studies that focused on each of the three factors separately (e.g. Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1982), Parikh and Krasucki (1990), Ellison and Fudenberg (1995), Gale and
Kariv (2003), Rosenberg et al. (2009), Demarzo et al. (2003) and Golub and Jackson (2010)), the
generalized framework we provide directly establishes an explicit characterization of how the three
factors interactively shape individual beliefs. We also provide a stylized model for an exit game in
which economic agents partially rely on their level of confidence in their beliefs in deciding whether
or not to take an action (e.g. investing in a given project) or wait to collect more information. The
waiting process is however costly, such that each agent has to choose the optimal waiting time to
take an action. The purpose of this stylized model is to provide a characterization of the effect
of the learning mechanisms and the topology of the communication structure on the efficiency of
information aggregation. We start by making generalizations of some of the existing results in the
literature. More specifically, we establish the structure of public beliefs under rational learning
when agents are either certain or uncertain about others’ prior beliefs. We then extend existing
results on bounded-rational learning to dynamic communication networks. The main contribution
of the paper is the theorems providing the conditions on prior beliefs, private information and com-
munication network structures for public beliefs to correctly and efficiently aggregate decentralized
information. Public beliefs are said to be correct or to correctly aggregate private information if
they fully incorporate private information of all agents, and asymptotically correct if in the limit of
the population size, they converge in probability to the true state of nature.
The main results that emerge from this paper are the following. Proposition 1 provides the
expressions for the structure of public beliefs under rational learning for finite population. When
the communication network is common knowledge and connected, then a consensus in public beliefs
arises only if the prior beliefs are identical and observable to the neighbors. It is not necessary for
prior beliefs to be common knowledge among all agents for a consensus to emerge provided they
1A private belief is what results after an agent incorporates his private information into his prior belief.
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are observable to the neighbors. Proposition 1 also shows that when the communication network is
complete, a consensus in public beliefs obtains under uncertainty of prior beliefs provided the realized
prior beliefs are identical and correlated. Heterogeneity in public beliefs arises under two cases. The
first case is when the realized prior beliefs of neighbors are observable but heterogeneous, and the
second case is when the realized prior beliefs are identical but not observable to the neighbors.
In Proposition 2, we generalize the bounded-rational learning models to dynamic communica-
tion networks. We show that provided the switching strategy is such that there exists a positive
probability of realizing a connected network, then a consensus will obtain in a long-run.2 Public
beliefs will be heterogeneous otherwise.
In Theorems 1 and 2, we establish conditions for public beliefs to be asymptotically correct.
That is conditions under which public beliefs converge in probability for a large population size
to the true state of nature. Under rational learning, public beliefs will be asymptotically correct
even when agents are uncertain of others’ prior beliefs provided the prior beliefs and signals are
independently distributed and of finite spaces. The topology of the communication network does not
affect correctness of asymptotic public beliefs provided that it is common knowledge and connected.
Contrary to rational learning, under bounded-rational learning, the topology of the communication
network plays a significant role in determining correctness of public beliefs. We show that the
network must be perfectly balanced and asymptotically balanced for public beliefs and asymptotic
public beliefs respectively to be correct. We then characterize classes of networks that satisfy perfect
and asymptotic balancedness conditions. In addition to restrictions on the network topology, we
also find that under bounded-rational learning, public beliefs are asymptotically correct if and only
if the prior beliefs are correlated to the true state of nature. Specifically, agents prior beliefs must
be normally distributed with mean equal to the true state of nature and with finite variance.
In section 6 we compare the efficiency of private information aggregation by public beliefs under
rational and bounded-rational learning. We show that the price of rationality, which we define as
the ratio of expected social welfare under rational learning to the expected social welfare under
bounded-rational learning, is an inverse function of the population size. Implying that the larger
the population, the higher is the relative benefit of having an economy made up of rational agents.
We show that the speed at which private information is aggregated is faster under rational learning
than under bounded-rational learning.
2. Contribution to the literature
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, it is closely related
to the literature on knowledge and consensus (e.g Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), Parikh
and Krasucki (1990) and Krasucki (1996)). Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) showed that
repeated communication of posterior beliefs between two agents who start with a common prior
will eventually lead to a consensus in their public beliefs. Parikh and Krasucki (1990) generalize
the framework of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) to the case in which agents communicate
a general family of functions that map information sets to messages, of which posterior beliefs are
2A switching strategy is a function that maps an agent’s current position in the network (or simply the current
neighborhood) to another position in the next period.
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a special case. They then establish conditions on such functions under which a consensus in public
beliefs obtains. Krasucki (1996) extends the framework of Parikh and Krasucki (1990) to multiple
agents who communicate sequentially through a protocol that determines the sender and receiver.
They show that if the communication protocol does not consist of cycles, then a consensus in public
beliefs obtains.3 In all the above models, communication is sequential. That is it is defined by a
protocol that selects a pair of agents (a sender and a receiver) and in each period only one of them
is active. This is contrary to the case in this paper in which agents act simultaneously. The second
general difference is that in the above papers, private information is represented by an information
set which is defined by a partition of the state space. Such representation of private information
typically leads to multidimensional information structure, which implies that communication can
take multiple rounds even in the case of two agents before a consensus in beliefs is finally reached.
On the contrary we adopt a simpler information structure that allows us to focus on the main
questions concerning learning in general networks and properties of public beliefs. Indeed, as in
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and Parikh and Krasucki (1990) we find that when the
communication network is complete or rather when posterior beliefs announcements are public, a
consensus emerges provided prior beliefs are common knowledge and identical. But as an extension
to this result, we show that it is not necessary for agents to be certain of others’ prior beliefs for a
consensus to obtain. All that matters is that prior beliefs are correlated and that the realizations
are identical. When the communication network is not complete, we find as in Krasucki (1996)
that the network must be connected if a consensus is to obtain. We then characterize conditions
for heterogeneity and correctness in public beliefs to obtain.
Secondly, this paper is related to the literature on Bayesian learning with rational agents in
social networks (e.g. Gale and Kariv (2003), Rosenberg et al. (2009) and Mueller-Frank (2013)).
Just as we do in this paper, these papers also consider simultaneous communication among agents
but with the difference that agents communicate their actions rather than the posterior beliefs.4
These papers also consider a multidimensional information structure as in the case of the models
on knowledge and consensus above. The primary focus of this literature is on the uniformity and
local indifference in the actions chosen by the agents at the end of the learning process, which
is contrary to our focus on public beliefs. Nevertheless, some of our findings extend directly to
situations where agents communicate actions rather than posterior beliefs.5 Rosenberg et al. (2009)
and Mueller-Frank (2013) show that under the assumptions of connected network, common prior,
common knowledge of strategies and network topology, heterogeneity in agents’ actions at the end
of learning process arises from. Here, we show that heterogeneity in public beliefs hence actions
3A cycle is a closed path, where a path from agent i to agent j is a connected set of links starting from i and
ending in j.
4There also exists a literature on sequential Bayesian learning in which agents make a decision once in a lifetime
in an exogenously predefined order. When it is an agent’s turn to act, he observes the history of actions of all agents
that acted before him. The primary concern of this literature is establishing conditions under which informational
cascades and herds behavior occurs. The main contributions are Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992), Smith
and Sorensen (2000) and Acemoglu et al. (2011).
5This is particularly true because communicating posterior beliefs is equivalent to communicating actions when
the action space is rich (for example the continuous action space) and/or when strategies are common knowledge as
in the case partly considered by Mueller-Frank (2013).
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(see section 6.2) can also arise from heterogeneity and uncertainty of prior beliefs.
Thirdly, this paper is related to the literature on agreement and disagreement under Bayesian
rational learning (e.g Dixit andWeibull (2007), Cripps et al. (2008), Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Sethi
and Yildiz (2012)). Cripps et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2009) study the validity of observational
learning as a justification for the common prior assumption generally employed in most economics
models. That is, individuals that share their experiences with each other will eventually have a
shared history of events that are informative about the state of nature, and this will in turn lead to
an agreement on their beliefs about the true state of nature. The framework employed by Cripps
et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2009) to model this claim consists of two agents who observe a
sequence of either private or public signals that are necessarily informative about the true state of
nature. Cripps et al. (2008) show that when both agents observe a sequence of correlated private
signals then their beliefs converge to a common public belief provided that the signal space is finite.
Acemoglu et al. (2009) show that if agents start with heterogeneous prior beliefs, then observe a
sequence of public signals and that they are uncertain about signal interpretation, then they do
not necessarily converge to a common public belief. In our framework, rather than agents having
to observe and learn from exogenously “communicated” signals, they in stead learn endogenously
through direct communication with their immediate neighbors in the network. Our framework for
rational learning is thus similar to that of Cripps et al. (2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2009), whereby an
infinite sequence of signals corresponds to an infinite set of agents each of whose private information
is realized independently of the others. There is a difference in terms of the “time factor” though. In
our framework, the number of signals an agent receives (by observing the neighbors announcements)
at any given period t depends on the number of t-order neighbors. As a consequence the speed of
learning is generally faster (depending on the network topology) in our framework. Indeed, as in
Cripps et al. (2008) we find that provided that the distribution from which the signals are drawn
has bounded variance, a consensus obtains in the limit of the number of agents. In relation to
Acemoglu et al. (2009), the uncertainty on how to interpret the signal is related to the case in which
agents do not observe the prior beliefs of their neighbors. The uncertainty of neighbors’ priors leads
to uncertainty on how to interpret their announcements, which in turn leads to uncertainty on the
signal interpretation. Contrary to Acemoglu et al. (2009) we show that asymptotic consensus obtains
provided the signal space is finite and that the distribution of prior beliefs, hence of expected signals
is bounded. Heterogeneity obtains otherwise. Additionally we show that under such conditions, a
consensus also implies correct asymptotic beliefs.
Dixit and Weibull (2007) and Sethi and Yildiz (2012) study the polarization in public beliefs
between two groups of agents when agents do not observe the prior beliefs of other agents outside of
their group. They show how uncertainty of prior beliefs reinforces disagreement in opinions of the
members of different groups. The findings in Dixit and Weibull (2007) and Sethi and Yildiz (2012)
are special cases of this paper when the communication network is complete.
The closely related papers in the literature of bounded-rational learning are Demarzo et al.
(2003) and Golub and Jackson (2010). The main difference with this paper is our assumption
that agents start with private beliefs that are of finite precision. This assumption enables us to
analyze the efficiency of information aggregation by public beliefs under bounded-rational learning
and compare it with that under rational learning. In Proposition 2 we generalize the findings in
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Demarzo et al. (2003), Golub and Jackson (2010) concerning the convergent beliefs to dynamic
networks. We show that the communication network does not necessarily have to be connected at
all periods for a consensus to obtain. Specifically, a consensus in public beliefs will always emerge
in a long-run provide that there exists a positive probability of realizing a connected network.
Golub and Jackson (2010) study conditions on the communication network for wisdom of crowds
to obtain. Their definition of a wise crowd is closely related to our definition of correct asymptotic
public beliefs in a weak sense (see Definition 2). They show that a society will be wise if for any
finite-size subgroup of agents, the sum of weights connecting such a subgroup to the rest of the
society is sufficiently large, and vise versa. That is, there should not be a subgroup of agents
that stays prominent in the limit of population size. There are two major differences between our
characterization of correct public beliefs from that of Golub and Jackson (2010). The first involves
the initial conditions, whereby in Golub and Jackson (2010) it is assumed that agents’ prior beliefs
are drawn from a normal distribution with mean equal to the true state of nature. On the contrary,
we model a general case in which prior beliefs are distributed heterogeneously across the population.
We then show that a necessary condition for public beliefs to correctly aggregate private information
is for prior beliefs to be correlated with the true state of nature. In other words, the initial condition
of Golub and Jackson (2010) is derived as a necessary condition in our case. The second difference
is that Golub and Jackson (2010) characterize conditions on the network topology under which
wisdom does not occur. On the contrary, we characterize conditions under which wisdom occurs
and in Theorem 2 we show that a network must be asymptotically balanced for a society to be wise.
To demonstrate the generality of our approach, we provide an example in which public beliefs are
not correct under Golub and Jackson (2010) but are correct in our case. We then further show as
a corollary that correct public beliefs obtain in Erdös-Rényi family of random networks but not in
networks formed through preferential attachment, like scale-free networks.
There is also a related literature on bounded-rational learning in physics and computer science
which we shall not review in detail here. It focuses on conditions for a consensus to be attained
contrary to this paper in which the primary goal is on the correctness of public beliefs and how it
relates to rational learning. See Jackson (2008) for more references on related models.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3 we outline the framework of commu-
nication and learning, providing the informational and communication structure. Section 4 presents
the characterization of the general structure of public beliefs for a finite population. Section 5 char-
acterizes the conditions on the informational and communication network structures under which
public beliefs correctly aggregate decentralize information. Section 6 deals with convergence rates
and efficient information aggregation. All proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
3. The model
The set of agents is denoted by N = {1, · · · , i, · · · , n}. There is a state of nature X that is
unknown and unobservable to all agents. The true value of X is µ¯ or generally a Dirac delta function
centered at µ¯. Agents form and update beliefs about X. We assume without loss of generality that
the prior belief of each i ∈ N is a normal distribution with mean µi and unit variance. That is
each i ∈ N initially believes that X is normally distributed with mean µi,0 and unit variance. The
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assumption of unit variance is for simplicity and does not affect the main conclusions of the paper.
We model agents’ uncertainty of others’ prior beliefs by assuming that they are normally dis-
tributed with mean νi for each i ∈ N and variance-covariance matrix M with entries mij ≥ 0 for
all (i, j) ∈ N . That is
µ0 ∼ N (ν,M) and X ∼i N (µi,0, 1)
where µ0 and ν are column vectors of µi,0 and νi for all i ∈ N respectively, and ∼i means “dis-
tribution according to i”. For a clearer exposition, we refer to the pair (µi,0, 1) as prior belief of
i ∈ N and the pair (νi,Mi), where Mi is the ith row of M , as i’s prior belief distribution. When
the prior beliefs are independently distributed then i’s prior belief distribution will simply be the
pair (νi, η2), where η2 is the associated variance. The assumption that X is normally distributed is
also for simplicity and does not affect our main results.
Given prior beliefs, each agent observes a private signal si that is informative about X, and takes
the form si = X + εi. Conditional on µi,0, each i believes that X and ε1, · · · , εn are independently
distributed, and it is common knowledge that εi ∼ N (0, σ2) for all i ∈ N Agents therefore differ
with respect to their prior beliefs and private information, and our goal is to study the public beliefs
resulting from deliberation under general communication networks. In what follows, we denote by
µi,t for the mean associated with the posterior belief of i at period t, and by vari,t for the associated
variance.
Lemma 1: Given that X is normally distributed with mean µi,0 and unit variance, after observing
the signal si it follows by Bayes rule that i’s posterior belief becomes X ∼i N (µi,1, vari,1), where
µi,1 = σ
2
1+σ2µi,0 +
1
1+σ2 si and vari,1 =
σ2
1+σ2 .
Lemma 1 follows from the Bayesian relation that given X ∼ N (µ, pi2) and ε ∼ N (0, σ2), if
s = X + ε then
(1) E [X|s] = σ
2
pi2 + σ2µ+
1
pi2 + σ2 s.
3.1. Communication network
The communication among agents is modeled through an associated network or graph. Let
G(n,E) be a graph with n vertices representing the number of agents and E is the set of edges
linking different pairs of agents such that a graph gij defines a communication link between i and j.
In particular if gij > 0, then j communicates to i, or simply that i observes j’s posterior beliefs, and
gij = 0 implies the absence of communication between i and j. No strict restrictions are imposed
on gij ’s except that 0 ≤ gij ≤ 1. In particular it is not necessary that gij = gji. The corresponding
adjacency matrix of interactions is denoted by G.6
The first-order neighborhood Ni,1 is the set of agents that directly communicate with i. That
is, Ni,1 = {j ∈ N ; gij > 0}. The corresponding cardinality of Ni,1, ki,1 = #Ni,1, is the first-order
degree of i. A path between i and j is a connected set of links Pij = {gi1, g12, · · · , g(j−1)j} such
that gij > 0 for each gij ∈Pij . The length of the path between i and j is denoted by |Pij |, which
is simply the L1 norm of Pij . We can then define the second-order neighborhood of i, Ni,2 as the
6We use G to denote both the underlying network and the corresponding matrix unless otherwise specified.
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set of agents, indexed by j2, such that for each j2 ∈ Ni,2 there exists a path of length two between
i and j. That is Ni,2 = {j ∈ N ; |Pij | = 2}. The second-order degree of i is ki,2 = #Ni,2. In a
similar logic we can define the t-order neighborhood of i as a set, Ni,t = {j ∈ N ; |Pij | = t}. The
corresponding t-order degree is denoted by ki,t = #Ni,t.
Property 1: A communication network with the corresponding matrix G is said to be connected
if for any two agents (i, j) ∈ N , there exists a path of at least one step from i to j and vice versa.
Definition 1: (a) A geodesic dij(G) between two agents (i, j) ∈ N is the shortest path between
them. That is dij(G) = min{|Pij |; for a pair of agents {i, j} ∈ N}.
(b) The diameter of a network G, D(G) is its longest geodesic. That is
D(G) = max
{i,j}∈N
{|Pij |; ∀i, j ∈ N}.
A network is said to be finite if its diameter is finite. Note that it is possible for the network to
be finite when the population size is infinite.
3.2. Dynamic networks
We also consider dynamic communication structure in which the neighborhood of an agent
changes over time. We do not define the specific mechanism by which agents switch their neigh-
borhood but rather consider a generic and an arbitrary switching mechanism. Such mechanism
can be strategic or simply random. The strategy can be a function of the current position in the
network and/or other agents observable characteristics. See for example Sethi and Yildiz (2013)
for a switching mechanism that depends on the precision of opponents’ private information, and
König et al. (2009) for a switching mechanism that depends on network related properties such as
the centrality of an agent.
To be precise, let γ be the switching strategy or simply the switching signal, defined as γ : N →
G. We then denote by G = {Gγ(1), · · · , Gγ(t), · · · } as a class/set of all possible networks or graphs
that can be defined on the set of agents N as a result of the switching strategy γ. Gγ(t) is therefore
the resulting network at time t from switching strategy γ. Under such dynamics, it is then possible
that at certain periods some agents do not have any neighbors, that it ki,0 = 0.
A special case of this dynamic interaction structure includes that in which the switching strategy
maps into the same network structure over time. That is Gγ(1) = · · · = Gγ(t) = · · · . We denote such
a switching strategy by γ0. Another special case is when the switching strategy induces a connected
network structure at each period. That is each Gγ(t) for all t is connected. Let such a switching
strategy be denoted by γc.
3.3. Rational learning
Under rational learning, given the prior beliefs and after observing the signal si, each i ∈
N computes their posterior belief. The posterior beliefs are then truthfully announced to the
corresponding neighbors. After observing their neighbors’ announcements, each i ∈ N updates
their belief and the resulting posterior beliefs are again simultaneously announced to the neighbors
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at the end of that period, and so forth. The sequential process continues until each agent’s posterior
announcements are constant, in which case each agent has no new information to learn from their
neighbors. The limit belief of each i ∈ N becomes common knowledge to his first-order neighbors,
and we refer it as a local public belief or simply public belief. The crucial assumptions in the
rational learning mechanism are common knowledge of rationality, and that agents have memory
of the history of their neighbors announcements.
Example 1: Consider two agents N = {a, b} such that gab = gba = 1; an undirected link
exists between a and b. Let the prior beliefs be normally distributed such that X ∼a N (µa,0, 1) and
X ∼b N (µb,0, 1), and the private signals be sa = X + εa and sb = X + εb respectively. As defined
above, assume that X, εa, εb are independently distributed and that εa and εb are independent and
identically distributed with εi ∼ N (0, σ2) for all i = a, b.
In the first round, after observing signals, it follows from Lemma 1 that the posterior beliefs
of both agents become X ∼i N (µi,1, vari,1) for i = a, b. Whereµi,1 = σ21+σ2µi,0 + 11+σ2 si and
vari,1 = σ
2
1+σ2 . At the end of the first round each agent announces their posterior beliefs. From
b’s announcement, a knows that
(2) (1 + σ2)µb,1 = σ2µb,0 + sb
If we assume that a knows the prior belief of b, that is a knows that b’s prior belief is normally
distributed with mean µb,0 and unit variance, then a can deduce sb from the first period announcement
of b. The similar argument follows for b since gba = 1. Combining their posterior beliefs at the
end of the first period together with the deduced signals sa and sb, both agents update their beliefs to
X ∼i N (µi,2, vari,2) for i = a, b, where
µi,2 =
σ2
2 + σ2µi,0 +
1
2 + σ2 (sa + sb), vari,2 =
σ2
2 + σ2
From the announcements at the end of the second period, both a and b do not have anymore in-
formation to learn from each others’ announcements. Learning stops, and their posterior beliefs
become public information.
3.4. Bounded-rational learning
Under bounded-rational learning, agents update their beliefs sequentially just like in the case
rational learning except that they are not able to disentangle between old and new information from
announcements of their first-order neighbors. After receiving private signals, each agent updates
their prior belief in accordance to Bayes rule as in Lemma 1. The resulting private beliefs are then
communicated to the first-order neighbors. From the second period onwards, agents incorporate
information from their first-order neighbors by simply taking the weighted average of their posterior
beliefs. That is, at period t i’s posterior mean is given by
(3) µi,t+1 =
N∑
j=1
gij(t)µj,t i = 1, · · · , n
where 0 ≤ gij(t) ≤ 1 is the weight that i attaches to j’s announcement at period t. Since each
agents revises their belief in every period, it follows that gii(t) > 0 for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. If Gγ(t)
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is the associated matrix of interactions in the t-th period, then (3) can be written as
(4) µt+1 = Gγ(t)µt
where µt is a vector of posterior means in the t-th period. We assume that the same updating rule
applies to even the variance of precision of agents beliefs.
4. Public beliefs
In this section, we characterize the general structure of public beliefs under the informational
structure described above. We focus of the case of a finite population and provide conditions for
heterogeneity and consensus in public beliefs to obtain.
4.1. Rational learning
The following theorem establishes the structure of public beliefs under rational learning.
Proposition 1: Let the communication network be common knowledge and connected. Let
also µi,∞ and vari,∞ denote the mean and variance of i’s public belief respectively. Under rational
learning the public belief of each i ∈ N is normally distributed with mean and variance as follows.
(i) If for each i ∈ N , µj,0 for all j ∈ Ni,1 are observable, then
(5) µi,∞ =
σ2
n+ σ2µi,0 +
1
n+ σ2
n∑
j=0
sj and vari,∞ =
σ2
n+ σ2
for all i ∈ N , where s0 = si
(ii) If for each i ∈ N , µj,0 for all j ∈ Ni,1 are unobservable but it is common knowledge that
µ0 ∼ N (ν, η2I), where µ0 is a column vector of all µi,0 and I is an n × n identity matrix,
then
µi,∞ =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1µi,1 +
1
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
∑
l∈N\{i}
Ei[sl|ν]
and
vari,∞ =
σ2
(
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
where Ei[sl|ν] = σ2 (µl,0 − νl) + sl for all i ∈ N and all l ∈ N \ {i} is the expected signal of l
according to i given ν.
(iii) If the communication network is complete and it is common knowledge that µ0 ∼ N (ν,M),
where mij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N , then µi,∞ and vari,∞ are as in (5) above.
Proof. See Appendix A.1
The first implication of Proposition 1 (i) is that when agents observe their neighbors’ prior
beliefs and that the communication network is common knowledge and connected, public beliefs
fully incorporate all private information. The second implication is that under similar conditions
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on the network and prior beliefs, if the realized prior beliefs are identical, then a consensus in
public beliefs obtain. This result is consistent with that of the literature on common knowledge and
consensus, for example Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) and Parikh and Krasucki (1990) in
which they find that a consensus arises under a common prior assumption. Similarly in the literature
of Bayesian rational learning on network for example Gale and Kariv (2003) and Mueller-Frank
(2013) it is established that a consensus (in actions) arises under common prior assumption and
connectedness of the communication network. The only supplement to these papers in this regard
is that Proposition 1 (i) also emphasizes the fact that prior beliefs do not have to be common
knowledge for consensus to obtain, but rather they are observable to the first-order neighbor.
The third implication of Proposition 1 (i) is that heterogeneity in prior beliefs leads to hetero-
geneity in public beliefs. That is, let µoi,∞ denote the public belief of i when neighbor’s prior are
observable, then for any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ N it follows from (5) that
(6) µoi,∞ − µoj,∞ =
σ2
n+ σ2 (µi,0 − µj,0)
in which case only the heterogeneity in prior beliefs leads to heterogeneity in public beliefs. This
result also complements the literature on rational learning which has focused mainly on learning
under common prior beliefs.
Proposition 1 (ii) establishes the structure of public beliefs when agents are uncertain about oth-
ers’ prior beliefs. Generally, public beliefs exhibit three sources of heterogeneity under uncertainty
of prior beliefs. Heterogeneity could result from a difference in the realized priors and/or signals, as
well as a difference in prior beliefs distributions if it exists. To see this notice that under assumptions
of Proposition 1 (ii), for any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ N , Ei[sl|νk] = Ej [sl|νr] = σ2 (µl,0 − νl) + sl for
each k ∈ Ni,1, r ∈ Nj,1 and all l ∈ N . Let µui,∞ denote the public belief of i when neighbor’s prior
are unobservable, then for any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ N
(7) µui,∞ − µuj,∞ =
σ2
(
η2σ2(µi,0 − µj,0) + η2(si − sj) + (νi − νj)
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
Implying that if the distributions of prior beliefs are heterogeneous, then heterogeneity in public
beliefs can still arise even under identical realized priors and signals.
In comparison to the case in which priors are observable, the precision of public beliefs when
priors are unobservable is always lower. That is let varoi,∞ and varui,∞ be the variance of i’s public
beliefs when prior beliefs are observable and unobservable respectively, then
(8) varoi,∞ − varui,∞ =
−σ2(n− 1) (η2σ2)
(σ2 + n)((1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1) < 0
This implies that agents’ confidence in their beliefs at the end of the learning process is always
lower when they are uncertain of their neighbors’ prior beliefs compared to when they observe their
neighbors’ prior beliefs.
Proposition 1 (iii) entails two main implications. Since a pair of agents with an undirected link
between them is a simplest form of a complete network, Proposition 1 (iii) implies that the findings
in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) extend to the case in which agents are uncertain of other’s
prior beliefs provided that their prior beliefs are correlated. This is a particularly strong result given
that the literature on knowledge and consensus has always emphasized the condition of common
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knowledge of prior beliefs as a prerequisite for a consensus to obtain. Note the distinction we make
between common knowledge of prior beliefs and common knowledge of prior beliefs’ distributions.
Proposition 1 (iii) shows that the necessary condition for consensus to emerge under rational learn-
ing when the network is complete, is prior beliefs’ to be correlated and their distributions to be
common knowledge. The second implication of Proposition 1 (iii) is that provided the network is
complete and that prior beliefs are correlated, then public beliefs fully incorporate dispersed private
information.
We do not go into the detailed analysis of the outcomes of rational learning when the communi-
cation network is dynamic because the requirements on agents’ knowledge of the network switching
strategies amounts to assuming common knowledge of the network structure, and therefore does
not affect the final outcome. To see this, notice that the assumption that agents recall the history
of their neighbors’ announcements is indispensable if they are to be able to deduce the private
information (or the expected private information) of their t-order neighbors. This then requires
agents to have knowledge of the past and current positions of all agents in the network, which is
equivalent to assuming common knowledge of the network. On the other hand, when the communi-
cation network is common knowledge, its topology does not affect the general properties of public
beliefs. Hence, under rational learning, whether or not the network is dynamic does not affect the
general properties of public beliefs.
4.2. Bounded-rational learning
The dynamic system (4) can generally be treated as a non-homogeneous Markov chain, and the
special case in which γ = γc is a homogeneous Markov chain. The convergence properties of non-
homogeneous Markov chains has been well established in the literature, and it particularly depends
on the irreducibility and aperiodicity properties of the transition matrices Gγ(t) for all t ≥ 0. A
Markov chain (transition matrix) is said to be irreducible if it is possible to make a transition from
any one state to every other state, not necessarily in one time step. In the context of communication
networks described in section 3.1, irreducibility of the network or the matrix induced by the network
implies that a path Pij between any pair of agents (i, j) ∈ N exists. Aperiodicity on the hand
implies that there does not exists two or more groups of agents for which communication is possible
only among groups and not within groups. For the communication structure considered in this
paper, aperiodicity is guaranteed since self loops exists. A more general property of Markov chains
that guarantees convergence to well defined characteristics is that of ergodicity. Ergodic Markov
chains are irreducible, aperiodic and recurrent. A Markov chain is recurrent if every state is revisited
infinitely many times. The following lemma summarizes the properties of ergodic Markov chains
and at the same time acts as a definition for an ergodic chain.
Lemma 2: Let G = {Gγ(t)}t≥0 be (an infinite) sequence of finite matrices. If a Markov chain
formed as a product of matrices in G is ergodic, then
(9) lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
Gγ(t) = ev′
where e is a column vector of ones, v is a column vector of real values and v′ is the transpose of v.
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Proof. The proof can be found in Wolfowitz (1963).
Note that ev′ is an n × n matrix with identical rows, hence it is of unit rank. The analysis
of the convergence of (4) then reduces to determining the conditions under which a sequence of
communication networks induced by a switching strategy γ lead to an ergodic Markov chain. The
following proposition provides such conditions.
Proposition 2: Let τ ≥ 0 be a sufficiently large integer. If the switching strategy γ is such that
in every time interval [t, t+ τ) a connected communication network obtains, then
(10) µi,∞ =
[
lim
T→∞
GTµ1
]
i
= v′µ1 for every i ∈ N
where GT = ∏Tt=0Gγ(t).
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
Proposition 2 states that under some restrictions on the switching strategy, specifically that there
be a positive probability of realizing a connected network, a consensus in public beliefs obtains. The
public beliefs are a weighted average of the initial private beliefs. The weights vector v generally
depends on the network structure. To understand the nature of the weights vector let us consider
the special case in which γ = γc, that is in which γ maps into the same network topology. This
special case is that of static networks studied in Demarzo et al. (2003) and Golub and Jackson
(2010), in which case the weight vector v is related to the left eigenvector of Gγc associated with the
leading eigenvalue. The left eigenvector is normally associated with the measure of centrality; the
eigenvector centrality (see Bonacich and Lloyd (2001) and the references therein). The centrality
measures quantifies the level of influence of each agent. That is for each i ∈ N , the ith value of v,
vi is the measure of how influential i is in shaping public beliefs. The composition of the vector v is
thus central in determining the correctness and quality of public beliefs. For a detailed exposition
of the nature of the weight vector v we refer the reader to Demarzo et al. (2003) and Golub and
Jackson (2010), we only provide a simple example below.
Example 2: Let G1 denote the associated transition matrix of the communication network in
Figure 1a and G2 for the that in Figure 1b, and let the corresponding weights vectors be v1 and v2
respectively. A power iteration of each transition matrix results into
v1 = (0.363, 0.204, 0.191, 0.073, 0.121, 0.048) and v2 = (0, 0, 0, 0.359, 0.381, 0.260).
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Clearly, the influence of each agent depends on their first-order connectivity and the their closeness
to other agents who are also have high first order-connectivity. Take for example the network G1 of
Figure 1a in which agents d and f both observe announcements of only one other agent and both
communicate to one other agent. Though the first-order neighbor of agent f attaches more weight
to f ’s announcements than does the first-order neighbor of agent d, agent d is more influential than
f in a long-run. This is precisely the effect of being connected to other agents who are themselves
have higher first-order connectivity, as is the case of a and e who are the first-order neighbors of d
and f respectively.
In the case of communication network in Figure 1b, there are two subgroups (that is {a, b, c} and
{d, e, f}) each of whom form a complete subgroup. The inter-subgroup communication on the other
hand is unidirectional, that is members of subgroup {a, b, c} observe and learn from announcements
of those in subgroup {d, e, f} and not vise versa. As a consequence, a consensus emerges in a long-
run in which member of subgroup {a, b, c} adopt public beliefs of subgroup {d, e, f}. This example
highlights the effect of the presence of prominent “families” discussed in Bala and Goyal (1998) in
a different model but related in the sense that they also assume bounded-rationality of among as in
this case.
In general, under bounded-rational learning public beliefs are greatly influenced by the topology
of the communication network and the distribution of private information. That is public belief of
i will be normally distributed with mean
(11) µi,∞ =
n∑
j=1
vj
(
σ2
1 + σ2µi,0 +
1
1 + σ2 sj
)
.
and variance
vari,1 =
n∑
j=1
vj
σ2
1 + σ2 =
σ2
1 + σ2
The implication is that, under bounded-rational learning, if agents start with an identical level of
precision or confidence in their beliefs, they stay so even after the learning process has ended. This
result highlights the weakness associated with bounded-rational learning in correct aggregation of
private information as will be elaborated in the following subsection.
5. Correct public beliefs
Correctness of public beliefs generally depends on whether or not they fully incorporate private
information of all other agents and not just of their first-order neighbors. If private information
of all agents is fully incorporated then we would expect the public beliefs to converge jointly in
probability for large n to the true state of nature. We differentiate correctness in public beliefs for
finite population from that when the population size is infinite. For a clear distinction, we refer
to beliefs resulting from learning as the population size goes to infinity as asymptotic public beliefs
as opposed to just public beliefs for finite population. Public beliefs are said to be correct if they
fully incorporate private information of all other agents. In the case of asymptotic public beliefs we
differentiate between correctness in a weak and strong sense. That is, public beliefs are correct in
a strong sense if for each agent it converges in probability to a Dirac delta function centered at the
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true state of nature µ¯, and in the weak sense if it converges in probability to a normal distribution
centered at the true state of nature and not necessarily zero variance. Based on these definitions it
is easy to see that the basic requirement for both public beliefs and asymptotic public beliefs to be
correct is the communication network to be connected. We therefore will not repeatedly emphasize
this fact in most of the analysis that follows.
In the case of rational learning we have already provided conditions for public beliefs to fully
incorporate private information of other agents, so we will now focus on correctness of asymptotic
public beliefs below. To precisely define convergence in probability, we need to define a sequence
of networks for a growing population size n. We let G(n) denote the network or equivalently the
corresponding matrix when the population size is n. This then implies that there are two limits
in the learning processes above; the limit for time t and for population size n. To study such
dynamic processes, we have to assume that one of the two limits is reached faster than the other.
Alternatively, and perhaps even more intuitive, we first fix the network topology and derive the
corresponding nature of public beliefs, then study the evolution of public beliefs for a growing
population size. The population size should grow in such a way that the topology (or at least
the main characteristics) of the communication network are preserved. Given the nature of public
beliefs, we then study the sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2 of fixed topology and show conditions
under which convergence in probability of public beliefs to the true state of nature occurs. We
formally define strong and weak correctness of asymptotic public beliefs as follows.
Definition 2: (a) Asymptotic public beliefs are said to be correct in a strong sense if for each
i ∈ N
(12) lim
n→∞P (|µi,∞(n)− µ¯| > ) = 0 and limn→∞ vari,∞(n) = 0
for all possible realizations of µi,0.
(b) Asymptotic public beliefs are said to be correct in a weak sense if for each i ∈ N , condition
(12) is satisfied but
(13) lim
n→∞ vari,∞(n) <∞
Under strong correctness of asymptotic public beliefs we require that each agent’s public belief
converges in probability precisely to the true state of nature for all possible realizations of µi,0. For
weak correctness, the asymptotic public belief of each agent must place the most weight on the true
state of nature for all possible realizations of µi,0. With these definitions, if public beliefs are correct
in a strong sense then they are also correct in a weak sense.
5.1. Rational learning
As shown in Example 1 and Proposition 1, full incorporation of private information by public
beliefs in the case of rational learning depends on the observability of prior beliefs. We show below
that in addition to observability of prior beliefs, correctness of asymptotic public beliefs also depends
on the structure of prior beliefs and of private information, and in some cases on the structure of
the communication network. The following theorem establishes necessary conditions for asymptotic
public beliefs to be correct.
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Theorem 1: As a general condition, let the sequence {G(n)}n≥2 be common knowledge.
(i) When it is common knowledge that µ0 ∼ N (ν, η2I), then µi,∞(n) p−→ µ¯ and limn→∞ vari,∞(n) =
0 ∀i ∈ N if σ2 and η2 are finite.
(ii) When it is common knowledge that µ0 ∼ N (ν,M), where mij > 0 for all (i, j) ∈ N , then
µi,∞(n)
p−→ µ¯ and limn→∞ vari,∞(n) = 0 ∀i ∈ N if the communication network is complete
and that mii <∞.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
The general implication of Theorem 1 is that whenever asymptotic public beliefs are correct, they
are correct in a strong sense. Depending on the observability of prior beliefs though, there exists
a difference on the speed of convergence to correct asymptotic public beliefs, which is determined
by the rate at which the variance of an agent’s belief goes to zero. As indicated in the discussion
of Proposition 1, the variance associated with an agent’s public belief for a given population size
depends on the observability of prior beliefs.
Theorem 1 (i) shows that despite the difference in the speed of convergence, correct asymptotic
public beliefs obtain irrespective of uncertainty of others’ prior beliefs provided it is common knowl-
edge that prior beliefs are independently distributed, and that the signal space and prior beliefs
space are finite. That is σ2 < ∞ and η2 < ∞. Note that in Theorem 1, correct asymptotic public
beliefs also implies consensus in asymptotic public beliefs. The condition that the signal space must
be finite for correct learning (public beliefs in this case) to occur has been pointed out in other mod-
els of learning in the literature. For example Cripps et al. (2008), in which they show that a finite
signal space is necessary for a consensus to obtain in a learning model where two agents observe and
learn from a sequence of correlated private signals. Similarly in the literature of sequential Bayesian
learning, it is shown that boundedness of private beliefs plays a role in determining whether or not
wrong herds will emerge (Smith and Sorensen, 2000). Recall that a private belief is what results
after agents incorporate their realized signal into their prior belief, so in essence if the signal space
is finite then private beliefs are also finite/bounded.
Our claim that correct asymptotic public beliefs obtain irrespective of uncertainty of prior beliefs
provided that prior beliefs are independently distributed and that the signal and prior beliefs spaces
are finite, is a particularly strong result. Since uncertainty in prior beliefs in turn leads to uncertainty
in the signal interpretation, one would expect that the uncertainty in signal interpretation should
derail correctness in asymptotic public beliefs. Although our framework is different, this finding is
contrary to Acemoglu et al. (2009) who find that when two agents learn from a sequence of signals
and that they are uncertain of signal interpretation, then their beliefs do not necessarily converge
to a consensus (which is equivalent to correct public beliefs in our case). We find that asymptotic
consensus fails to arise only if the distribution of prior beliefs, hence of expected signals is not
bounded.
Theorem 1 (ii) establishes the basic condition for asymptotic public beliefs to be correct when the
distributions of prior beliefs are correlated and that the correlation coefficients are not necessarily
finite. In particular, the variance of the prior belief of each agent must be finite and that the
communication network is complete.
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5.2. Bounded rational learning
Under bounded-rational learning, the network topology almost solely determines the nature
of public beliefs and should thus equally influence their correctness. Since a consensus exists in
public beliefs, we can focus on the correctness of the public belief of a single agent for all possible
realizations of prior beliefs. Under bounded-rational learning, since agents incorporate others’ beliefs
by taking weighted averages, it follows that the public belief of an agent is said to be correct if it
attaches equal weight to the private beliefs of all other agents. The following definition formalizes
this observation.
Definition 3: Under bounded-rational learning, public beliefs are said to be correct or fully
aggregate private information if µi,∞(n) = Ave[µ1] and that vari,∞(n) <∞ for each i ∈ N , where
Ave[µ1] =
1
n
n∑
i=1
µi,1.
The following additional definitions are useful for a complete characterization of the results
below.
Definition 4: A matrix G(n) is said to be doubly stochastic if ∑nj=1 gij(n) = ∑ni=1 gij(n) = 1
for all (i, j) ∈ N
Definition 5: (a) A communication network is said to be perfectly balanced if the correspond-
ing matrix G(n) is doubly stochastic.
(b) A sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2 is said to be asymptotically balanced if limn→∞G(n) = S,
where S is an arbitrary doubly stochastic matrix.
Theorem 2: Under bounded-rational learning, if {µi,∞(n)}n≥2 for each i ∈ N is the sequence
of public beliefs corresponding to the sequence {G(n)}n≥2 of networks, then
(i) µi,∞(n) = Ave[µ1] and vari,∞(n) <∞ ∀i ∈ N if and only if
∑n
j=1 gij(n) =
∑n
i=1 gij(n) for all
(i, j) ∈ N .
(ii) µi,∞(n)
p−→ µ¯ and limn→∞ vari,∞(n) = σ1+σ ∀i ∈ N if and only if limn→∞G(n) = S, µ0 ∼
N (µ¯, η2I), and that σ2 and η2 are finite. Where µ¯ is an n dimensional vector of µ¯.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2 (i) implies that under bounded-rational learning, correct public beliefs obtain if
and only if the network is balanced. The extensiveness of the class of networks that satisfy the
balancedness condition depends on whether or not self-loops are permitted to be heterogeneous. If
the communication structure is such that all agents must place the same weight on their beliefs
(that is g11 = · · · = gnn), then there are limited network topologies that satisfy balancedness. If on
the other hand the weights gii for all agents are permitted to be heterogeneous then there exists a
wide range of networks that satisfy the balancedness condition. This can be checked by comparing
the first-order influences using the balancedness condition, that is ∑ni=1 gij = ∑ni=1 gik for j 6= k.
Which is equivalent to
gjj +
∑
i 6=j
gij = gkk +
∑
i 6=k
gik
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If gjj = gkk for all (j, k) ∈ N then it must be that
∑
i 6=j gij =
∑
i 6=k gik, which implies that all
(j, k) ∈ N must assign weights in an identical manner though not necessarily to the same first-order
neighbors. If on the contrary gjj 6= gkk for all (j, k) ∈ N such that
∑
i 6=j gij 6=
∑
i 6=k gik for all
(j, k) ∈ N , then agents can assign weights in different and various ways.
Theorem 2 (ii) has three main implications. First, under bounded-rational learning asymptotic
public beliefs can only be correct in a weak sense. Once agents start with beliefs that are not
completely precise (in the sense that the variance of prior beliefs is greater than zero), they will
not be able to learn the true state of nature with complete precision as in the case of rational
learning. Secondly, unlike in the case of rational learning where the distribution of prior beliefs
can be independent of the true state of nature, under bounded-rational learning asymptotic public
beliefs can only be correct if both the signals and prior beliefs are informative about the true state
of nature. That is the prior belief of each agent must be normally distributed with mean equal
to the true state of nature and finite variance. This restrictive condition highlights the superiority
of rational learning in aggregating privately information compared to bounded rational learning.
Third, correct asymptotic public beliefs obtain if and only if the network is asymptotically balanced.
The range of networks that are asymptotically balanced is wide and we explore their characterization
in the following subsection.
5.3. Asymptotically balanced networks
To characterize the class of communication networks that are asymptotically balanced, we need
to construct a measure of balancedness of a network/matrix. We denote by φ(n) for a network G(n)
as a measure of its balancedness defined as follows.
Definition 6: Let S(n) be closest doubly stochastic matrix in terms of the Frobenius norm to
the matrix G(n). Then G(n) is said to be φ(n)-balanced if given S(n),
‖S(n)−G(n)‖F = φ(n)
where ‖.‖F is the Frobenius norm.
We can then rephrase definition 5 (b) as saying that a sequence {G(n)}n≥2 is asymptotically
balanced if
lim
n→∞φ(n) = limn→∞ ‖S(n)−G(n)‖F = 0
The following proposition provides an expression for φ(n) for any stochastic matrix of size n.
Proposition 3: Let G(n) with entries gij(n) for (i, j) ∈ N be a stochastic matrix corresponding
to a communication network whose measure of balancedness φ(n) > 0. Then
(14) φ2(n) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
1−
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
Proof. See Appendix A.5.
Equation (14) gives an expression for the measure of balancedness of any arbitrary stochastic
matrix. The quantity ∑Ni=1 gij(n) = dinj (n) is the in-degree of agent j. It specifies the influence of j
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on her first-order neighbors’ beliefs. Unlike the out-degree douti (n) =
∑N
j=1 gij(n) that is normalized
to unity for all agents, the in-degree can generally be equal to, less or greater than unity. The higher
the value of dinj (n), the more influential j in terms of first-order influence. For various values of
n, dinj (n) for each j is a random variable whose distribution depends on how the communication
network scales with n. For a sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2 there exists a corresponding sequence
{dini (n)}n≥2 of in-degree for each i ∈ N . If we define dinmax(n) = maxi∈N{dini (n); i ∈ N}n≥2, then
for each sequence {G(n)}n≥2 there exists a corresponding sequence {dinmax(n)}n≥2.
The following theorem employs Proposition 3 to characterize conditions for a sequence of com-
munication networks to be asymptotically balanced.
Theorem 3: A sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2 with the corresponding sequence of maximum
in-degrees {dinmax(n)}n≥2 is asymptotically balanced if and only if
(i) limn→∞ dinmax(n) = 1
(ii) there exists an integer n′ > 0 such that for all n > n′ the quantity
h(n) =
n∑
j=1
(
1−
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
stays constant.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
There exists a wide range of network topologies that satisfy condition (i) in Theorem 3, including
random networks (graphs). To see this, notice that Theorem 3 (i) also implies that the sequence of
the influence of the most influential agent {vmax(n)}n≥2, where vmax(n) = maxi∈N{vi(n); i ∈ N}
must converge to zero for large n if the sequence {G(n)}n≥2 is to be asymptotically balanced.
This argument follows directly from the fact that the most influential agents are either those that
are the most connected or those that are connected to the most connected agents (see example
2). Now consider the Erdös-Rényi family of random networks with parameters n and p (that is a
random network G(n, p) of n agents in which each link is included in the network with probability
p independently of the other links), it is shown that for p ≥ log6 nn and for all i ∈ N (Mitra, 2009)
(15) c 1√
n
logn
log(np)
√
logn
np
− 1√
n
≤ v1(i) ≤ c 1√
n
logn
log(np)
√
logn
np
+ 1√
n
with probability 1 − o(1), where c > 0 is some constant. Clearly, for a sequence of such graphs it
follows that limn→∞ vmax(n) = 0.
The class of communication networks that is ruled out by Theorem 3 (i) is those that are formed
through preferential attachment, such as scale-free and generally high-clustering networks. In such
networks, dinmax(n) := f(n), where f is an increasing function in its argument. That is dinmax(n)
increases with n.
The following examples illustrate more other general network topologies that satisfy the two
conditions for asymptotic balancedness in Theorem 3 and one which does not.
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Example 3: (a) Consider a communication network that assumes a one dimensional lattice
structure in Figure 2. This example is adapted from Golub and Jackson (2010) to demonstrate
the generality of our Theorem 3 compared to the characterizations of wisdom of crowds in
Golub and Jackson (2010). They show that a society assuming a topology in Figure 2 is not
wise (that is public beliefs do not correctly aggregate private information), but we demonstrate
the contrary using Theorem 3.
1− ξ
21 3 n
1− ξ
1− ξ
ξ
1− ξ
ξ
ξ
1− ξ
ξξ
Figure 2: A network satisfying condition (ii) of Theorem 3
It is easy to see that in such a network, the quantity h(n) is constant and that
(16) φ2(n) = 2(1− 2ξ)
2
n
Implying that limn→∞ φ(n) = 0, hence public beliefs correctly aggregate private information.
(b) Consider the following two cases in which h(n) is not independent of n. In the communi-
cation network topology of Figure 3a, each agent’s first-order influence decays with n. The
corresponding φ2(n) is
(17) φ2(n) = 1
n
[(
ω − n− 1
n
ξ
)2
+ (n− 1)
(
ξ
n
− ω
n− 1
)2]
Consequently, limn→∞ φ(n) = 0, in which case asymptotic balancedness obtains.
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(a) Each agents influence decays with n
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(b) Player 1’s influence grows with n
Figure 3
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For the communication network of Figure 3b
(18) φ2(n) = 1
n
[
(ω − (n− 1)ξ)2 + (n− 1)
(
ξ − ω
n− 1
)2]
,
in which case limn→∞ φ(n) =∞. This is a general situation in which an agent or a subgroup of
agents posses unbounded influence. In such communication networks asymptotic balancedness
fails.
6. Convergence rate and efficient information aggregation
6.1. Convergence rate
In both learning mechanisms, the convergence rate depends solely on the topology of the commu-
nication network. The following proposition summarizes the convergence rates in terms of network
properties.
Proposition 4: Let Gγ(t) = Gγc for all t ≥ 0, where Gγc is the transition matrix resulting
from a communication network. Let λ2(Gγc) and D(Gγc) be the second largest eigenvalue and the
diameter of Gγc respectively. Denote by rR and rBR for the convergence rates of rational and
bounded-rational learning respectively, then
rR =
1
D(Gγc)
≥ ln(1/λ2(Gγc))ln(c) > λ2(Gγc) = rBR
Proof. See Appendix A.7.
Proposition 4 shows that rational learning generally converges faster than bounded-rational
learning. Specifically, under rational learning, it is the diameter of the communication network
that matters and all other properties such as clustering and skewness of degree distributions do
not matter as much. In the case of bounded-rational learning, clustering and the nature of degree
distributions matter since the second eigenvalue depends on them. For example, a network with a
given number of links in which agents are clustered into subgroups with few (or weak) connections
between subgroups generally has a higher second eigenvalue than a network with equal number of
agents and edges but in which edges are randomly distributed. Similarly, a network formed by
removing links from a “parent” network generally has a higher second eigenvalue than its “parent”
network. This argument follows from the well known concept of interlacing eigenvalues according
to Fiedler (1973). Finally if agents are highly “inward-looking” when updating their beliefs, that is
for each agent the weight of a self-loop is higher compared to the total weight of out-going links,
then such a network also has a higher second eigenvalue, hence slow convergence rate.
The relevance of the network topologies in determining the convergence rate becomes more
apparent in decision environments with discounted payoffs as will be demonstrated in the subsection
below.
6.2. Efficient information aggregation
To establish the efficiency of the two learning mechanisms and that of the network topologies
in aggregating information, we introduce a simple decision problem in which agents’ objective is to
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minimize the expected loss from mismatching their action and the true state of nature. Specifically,
each agent has two choices in each period; either to take an action a ∈ Ai, where Ai is a continuous
action space for i, or “wait” for the next period(s). The joint action space (which we assume to be
homogeneous for all agents, A1 = · · · = An) for each agent is thus A = {A,w}, where w stands
for “wait”. If an agent takes an action within the action space A, he “exits” the game, meaning
that he no longer learns and transmits new information but only transmits the same information
he possesses at the time of exit. If on the other hand the agent decides to wait, then his expected
loss for the next period is increased by a factor of 1δ , where 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. That is
Uit(a˜it, X) =
−
1
δtEi,t
[
(a˜it −X)2
]
if a˜it = a ∈ A
0 if a˜it = w
where Ei,t stands for expectation according to agent i at period t and a˜ ∈ A . We assume for
simplicity that agents are homogeneous in terms of payoff structure. The strategy of each agent
thus entails choosing the optimal period to exit the game.
Under this setup, it is easy to see that the optimal action a ∈ A for each agent at any given
period is
a∗it = Ei,t [X] = µi,t
and the payoff corresponding to the optimal action is
Uit(a∗it, X) = −
1
δt
Ei,t
[
(µi,t −X)2
]
= − 1
δt
vari,t
where vari,t is the variance of X according to i at period t. This implies that an agent’s exit time
depends on his confidence in his beliefs.
We can also define the associated expected social welfare as the average of individual optimal
expected utilities as follows.
Wt(X) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Uit(a∗it, X) = −
1
nδt
n∑
i=1
Ei,t
[
(µi,t −X)2
]
Consider first the case in which there is no cost on the payoffs associated with waiting, that is
when δ = 1. It is clear that it is optimal for agents to wait until all information has been exchanged
among all agents, which in the case of bounded-rational learning implies until a consensus is reached.
Now, consider a balanced network (which supports correct information aggregation under bounded-
rational learning) of size n. The optimal action (taken at the end of information exchange process)
under rational learning when priors are observable is
(19) a∗i∞ =
σ2
n+ σ2µi,0 +
1
n+ σ2
n∑
j=0
sj
and the corresponding expected social welfare W∞(X) is
(20) W∞(X) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ei,t
[
(a∗i∞ −X)2
]
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
vari,∞ = − σ
2
n+ σ2
where the last equality follows from Proposition 1 (i). Similarly for bounded-rational learning, the
optimal action is
(21) a∗i∞ =
1
n
n∑
j=1
(
σ2
1 + σ2µi,0 +
1
1 + σ2 sj
)
.
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where we have used the fact that for a balanced network of size n, the weights or influence vector
is v = ( 1n , · · · , 1n) (see the proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix A.4 for details). And the corresponding
expected social welfare is
(22) W∞(X) = − 1
n
n∑
i=1
Ei,t
[
(a∗i∞ −X)2
]
= − 1
n
n∑
i=1
vari,∞ = − σ
2
1 + σ2
The Price of Rationality (PoR) defined as the ratio of expected social welfare under rational
learning to the expected social welfare under bounded-rational learning, can then be used to analyze
how the efficiency of information aggregation (or learning in general) degrades due to bounded
rationality of the agents. From (20) and (22) we thus have,
(23) PoR = 1 + σ
2
n+ σ2
Note that since the expected social welfare is the sum of the expected loss or cost, its possible
maximum value is zero. It follows that the minimum possible value for the PoR is zero and its
maximum is one. When PoR is one, the two learning mechanisms measure equally and rationality
plays no role in the individual optimal decisions. If on the other hand PoR is zero, then rational
learning is infinitely more efficient in aggregating information than bounded rational learning. From
(23), PoR tends to zero with large n, implying that rationality becomes more and more important
in efficient aggregation of information as the population size increases. So long as δ = 1 and agents
do not find it costly to wait until all private information has been exchanged before taking action,
then the communication network does not matter and only the population size does matter. If
on the other hand δ < 1, the network topology starts to matter through its role in determining
the convergence rate. The convergence rate becomes critical since agents have to optimize when
to exit the game and if the convergence rate is high such that some or all agents exit the game
before all the private information has been exchanged, then the actions they take at the end of the
learning process will lead to higher expected loss hence lower expected social welfare. To formalize
this argument, we need to formally define correct asymptotic learning in terms of actions taken at
the end of the learning process. In this particular decision problem, correct asymptotic learning
coincide with correct asymptotic public beliefs, but this does not always have to be the case.
Definition 7: Given a sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2, correct asymptotic learning is said to
occur if
(24) lim
n→∞ limt→∞P (|ai,t(n)− µ¯| > ) = 0 for all i ∈ N
where µ¯ = ai,∞(∞) is the possible optimal action for all agents.
When δ = 1 the conditions for correct asymptotic learning is precisely those described in Theo-
rems 1 and 2 for rational and bounded-rational learning respectively, and the convergence rate does
not play much of a role in achieving correct asymptotic learning or public beliefs. If on the other
hand δ < 1, the convergence rate plays a big role in determining whether or not correct asymptotic
leaning actually occurs. This follows from the fact that when δ < 1 agents have to choose an optimal
exit time, and this has an impact on how much of the private information gets exchanged before
the learning process ends. It also implies that the topologies of the communication network that
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support correct asymptotic learning (and correct public beliefs) will no longer be those illustrated
in Theorems 1 and 2. The following proposition states conditions on the communication network
for correct asymptotic learning to occur when δ < 1.
Proposition 5: Let {G(n)}n≥2 be a sequence of connected communication networks, and that
let δ < 1. If {D(G(n))}n≥2 is the corresponding sequence of networks diameters, then correct
asymptotic learning obtains under rational learning if
(25) lim
n→∞
1
n
D(G(n)) = 0
Under bounded-rational learning, the network must be complete.
Proof. See Appendix A.8
Proposition 5 basically emphasizes the importance of the topology of the communication network
in determining the convergence rate hence efficient information aggregation, and can be summarized
as follows. When δ < 1, though waiting reduces the expected loss associated with a mismatch
between ones action and the true state of nature, waiting for too long on the other hand becomes
costly as prescribed by the factor 1/δ. It is therefore important that the convergence rate be high
if correct learning is to ever be achieved. Condition (25) is a necessary condition for both fast and
correct aggregation of information, hence correct asymptotic learning.
The network topology depicted in Figure 3 for example in which D(G(n)) = 2 for all n, satisfies
condition (25). The network topology in Figure 2 on the other hand does not satisfy condition (25),
since D(G(n)) = n. In the case of random graphs the diameter is generally an increasing function
of n (see for example Bollobás (1981) for analysis on the diameter of random graphs), hence correct
asymptotic learning does not obtain in random networks when δ < 1.
The failure by agents to account for informational externalities under bounded rational learning
is even more pronounced when δ < 1. All agents would prefer to take an action in the action space A
in the first or second periods since waiting longer does not improve their confidence in their beliefs.
We conclude this section by noting the indirect implication of Proposition 5. When the commu-
nication network has a large diameter and that agents find it costly to wait before taking an action,
even if agents start with a common prior, heterogeneity in public beliefs and actions will obtain.
7. Conclusion
Individual beliefs play a significant in determining the success of policies, initiatives and theories,
and play a significant role in determining outcomes in decisions under uncertainty. Contrary to pre-
diction from models of rationality and common prior assumptions that learning through deliberation
leads to a consensus in beliefs, heterogeneity in beliefs is more of a rule than an exception in most
economic and social environments. In this paper, we investigated the properties of beliefs resulting
from rational and bounded-rational learning in social networks. We established conditions under
which heterogeneity prevails, and under which such beliefs correctly aggregate private information.
Under bounded-rational learning, correctness in public beliefs is determined mainly by the topology
of the communication network. Specifically, for a finite population the network must be balanced
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and for large population it must be asymptotically balanced. In addition to restrictions on the net-
work topology, we also find that under bounded-rational learning, public beliefs are asymptotically
correct if and only if the prior beliefs are correlated to the true state of nature.
In section 6 we provide a “toy” model of decision making under uncertainty, in which agents
find it costly to wait much longer before taking an action. It highlights another possible source of
heterogeneity in public beliefs that is not necessarily a result of historical factors or of observability
of prior beliefs, but rather resulting from the topology of the communication network. That is,
under such conditions heterogeneity in public beliefs will arise if the communication network has a
large diameter.
Through out the paper we assumed that agents start with homogeneous confidence in their prior
beliefs. Relaxing this assumption would give a richer understanding of the nature of public beliefs
and distribution of actions in exit games or observed levels of diversity in public opinions across the
population even when agents are exposed to the same sources of information (e.g Chamley and Gale
(1994) and Murto and Välimäki (2011)). But this analysis requires a more detailed model (than
the one provided in section 6) with specific preference structure, and we postpone this question for
future research.
appendix
A.1. Proof of Proposition 1
(i) If X, ε1, · · · , εn are independent and it is common knowledge that ε1 ∼ N (0, σ2), then from
Lemma 1
µi,1 =
σ2
1 + σ2µi,0 +
1
1 + σ2 si, vari,1 =
σ2
1 + σ2 for all i ∈ N
We assume that under rational learning gij = 1 if j communicates to i and zero otherwise. Let G
be static and common knowledge, and let jt be the index for the t-order neighbors. Consider any
i ∈ N with first-order degree ki,1. After the first round of announcements, such an i updates his
beliefs to a normal distribution mean
µi,2 =
σ2
1 + ki,1 + σ2
µi,0 +
1
1 + ki,1 + σ2
si + ∑
j1∈Ni,1
sj1
 vari,2 = σ21 + ki,1 + σ2
where sj1 = (1 + σ2)µj1,1− σ2µj1,0 for all j1 ∈ Ni,1. If µj1,0 for all j1 ∈ Ni,1 are observable to i then
sj1 ’s are accurately deduced, otherwise µj1,0 is simply i’s ex-ante belief about the prior distribution
of j1.
Similarly, for all j1 ∈ Ni,1 and all l1 ∈ Nj1,1 we have
µj1,2 =
σ2
1 + kj1,1 + σ2
µj1,0 +
1
1 + kj1,1 + σ2
sj1 + ∑
l1∈Nj1,1
sl1

and varj1,2 = σ
2
1+kj1,1+σ2
.
Since i knows kj1,1 for all j1 ∈ Ni,1, hence Ni,2 and ki,2, he can deduce each
∑
l1∈Nj1,1 sl1 from
the first and second period announcements of all j1 ∈ Ni,1. The posterior belief of i in the third
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period is thus normally distributed with mean
µi,3 =
σ2
1 + ki,1 + ki,2 + σ2
µi,0 +
1
1 + ki,1 + ki,2 + σ2
si + ∑
j1∈Ni,1
sj1 +
∑
j2∈Ni,2
sj2

and variance
vari,3 =
σ2
1 + ki,1 + ki,2 + σ2
For a finite network, there exists a bound on the order of the neighborhood for all agents. That
is there exists a Ti for all i ∈ N such that for any t > Ti, Ni,t = 0, hence i stops updating his
beliefs after t = Ti. It then follows that Tm = max{Ti; i ∈ N}, which is also the diameter of the
communication network, is the period after which learning stops for all agents. After Tm no agents
has new information to learn from his neighbors. The iteration of posterior beliefs in a manner
described above leads to public belief of each i ∈ N to be normally distributed with the mean and
variance of the form
(A.1) µi,∞ =
σ2∑Tm
t=0 ki,t + σ2
µi,0 +
1∑Tm
t=0 ki,t + σ2
Tm∑
t=0
∑
jt∈Ni,t
sjt vari,∞ =
σ2∑Tm
t=0 ki,t + σ2
where sj0 = si and ki,0 = 1, and that
∑Tm
t=0 ki,t = n,
∑Tm
t=0
∑
jt∈Ni,t sjt =
∑n
j=1 sj .
(ii) Let agents’ prior beliefs be uncorrelated and that µ0 ∼ N (ν, η2I), where µ0 is a column
vector of all µi,0 and I is an n× n identity matrix. Assume also that agents know the distribution
of their neighbors prior beliefs but do not observe the realized value. Let Ei[sk|νj ] for each j ∈ Ni,1
denote the expected signal of k according to i given the distribution of his neighbor j’s prior belief.
It follows from Lemma 1 that, after observing his neighbors first period announcements, i deduces
the expected signals of each j ∈ Ni,1 to be
Ei[sj |νj ] =
(
1 + σ2
)
µj,1 − σ2νj
= σ2 (µj,0 − νj) + sj(A.2)
where the second equality result from substituting for µj,1. The corresponding variance of the
expected signal according to i is var[Ei[sj |νj ]] = σ4η2 + σ2.
After incorporating the expected signals from his neighbors, each i ∈ N updates his beliefs to a
normal distribution with mean and variance
µi,2 =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
ki + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
µi,1 +
1
ki + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
∑
j∈Ni,1
Ei[sj |νj ]
and
vari,2 =
σ2
(
1 + η2σ2
)
ki + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
Let l be the index for the neighbors of j ∈ Ni,1. We maintain the assumption that agents have
memory of past announcements of their neighbors and that the network is common knowledge.
From the second period announcements of his neighbors, i deduces the new information from each
j ∈ Ni,1 to be∑
l∈Nj,1
Ei[sl|νj ] =
(
kj +
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
))
µj,2 −
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
µj,1(A.3)
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where each Ei[sl|νj ] is of the form Ei[sl|νj ] = σ2 (µl,0 − νl) + sl. At the end of the third period, i
updates his beliefs to a normal distribution with mean and variance
µi,3 =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
ki + ki,2 + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
µi,1
+ 1
ki + ki,2 + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
 ∑
j∈Ni,1
Ei[sj |νj ] +
∑
j∈Ni,1
∑
l∈Nj,1
Ei[sl|νj ]
(A.4)
and
vari,3 =
σ2
(
1 + η2σ2
)
ki +
∑
j∈Ni,1 kj + (1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2)
By iterating the posterior beliefs until the end of the learning process and noting that∑Tmt=0 ki,t = n,
the public belief of each i ∈ N is then normally distributed with mean and variance
µi,∞ =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1µi,1 +
1
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
∑
l∈N\{i}
Ei[sl|ν]
and
vari,∞ =
σ2
(
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
(iii) In Proposition 1 (iii) we assume that µ0 ∼ N (ν,M), where each element of M , mij > 0 for
all (i, j) ∈ N .
The following notations will be used in the proof. We write µ and µ−i for the column vectors
of all µi for all i ∈ N and for all i ∈ N \ {i} respectively. Similarly, µ and ν−i denote the column
vectors of all νi for all i ∈ N and for all i ∈ N \ {i} respectively. M−i,−i denotes and n− 1× n− 1
variance-covariance matrix of all agents excluding i, and M−i,i is the ith column of M with the ith
row excluded. We also denote by 1k×l for a k× l dimensional matrix of ones, and by I the identity
matrix.
We employ the following well known concepts for normally distributed random variables and
specifically adopted to the distributions of prior beliefs of agents. Let µ0 be the column vector of
prior beliefs of all agents, µi,0 ∀i ∈ N and µ−i,0 ∀i ∈ N \ {i}. If µ0 ∼ N (ν,M), then
(A.5) E
[
µ−i,0|µi,0
]
= ν−i +m−1ii M−i,i (µi,0 − νi)
(A.6) var
[
µ−i,0|µi,0
]
= M−i,−i −m−1ii M−i,iM ′−i,i
When agents priors are correlated, the expected signal of each j ∈ Ni,1 according to i given the
realization µi,0 and j’s first period announcement µj,1 is given by
(A.7) Ei [sj |µi,0, µj,1] = (1 + σ2)µj,1 − σ2Ei [µj,0|µi,0]
In a similar manner, we can write the joint expected signals for all j ∈ Ni,1 according to an agent i
who observes the announcements of all other agents as follows
(A.8) Ei
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
= (1 + σ2)µ−i,1 − σ2Ei
[
µ−i,0|µi,0
]
which by substituting for µ−i,1 is equivalent to
(A.9) Ei
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
= σ2
(
µ−i,0 − Ei
[
µ−i,0|µi,0
])
+ s−i
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The variance associated with the expected signal is then
var
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
= σ4var
[
µ−i,0|µi,0
]
+ σ2I
= σ4
(
M−i,−i −m−1ii M−i,iM ′−i,i
)
+ σ2I(A.10)
We now derive the coefficient of Ei
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
in the second period announcement of i. Note
that the variance associated with µi,1 is σ
2
1+σ2 , and together with var
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
we can define
an n− 1× n− 1 matrix C as follows
C = 1n−1×n−1(
σ2
1+σ2
)
1n−1×n−1 + var
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
= (1 + σ
2)1n−1×n−1
σ21n−1×n−1 + σ2(1 + σ2)
(
σ2
(
M−i,−i −m−1ii M−i,iM ′−i,i
)
+ I
)(A.11)
Let Ci denote the ith row of C, that is
Ci = (1 + σ2)11×n−1
[
σ21n−1×n−1 + σ2(1 + σ2)
(
σ2
(
M−i,−i −m−1ii M−i,iM ′−i,i
)
+ I
)]−1
The elements of Ci are the coefficients associated with the expected signals of all j ∈ N \ {i} in the
second period announcement of i. We thus have
µi,2 = (1− Ci11×n−1)µi,1 + CiEi
[
s−i|µi,0,µ−i,1
]
= (1− Ci11×n−1)µi,1 + (1 + σ2)Ciµ−i,1 − σ2Ciν−i − σ2m−1ii CiM−i,i (µi,0 − νi)(A.12)
From the second period announcement of i, all agents who observe i’s announcements know that
µi,0 = νi +
(1− Ci11×n−1)µi,1 + (1 + σ2)Ciµ−i,1 − σ2Ciν−i − µi,2
σ2m−1ii CiM−i,i
(A.13)
From (A.13), each agent who communicates to i and i communicates to, will correctly deduce
µi,0 at the end of the second period announcements if and only if that agent also observes the
announcements of all other agents that communicate to i and i communicates to. This follows from
the fact that for any j ∈ Ni,1 to correctly deduce µi,0, then j must also observe all µk,1 ∈ µ−i,1
for k 6= j. The conclusion is that the communication network must be complete if agents are to
correctly deduce the neighbors’ realized prior beliefs and hence private information. That is, from
the second period announcements, all agents (who observes i’s announcements) deduces that
si = (1 + σ2)µi,1 − σ2
(
νi +
(1− Ci11×n−1)µi,1 + (1 + σ2)Ciµ−i,1 − σ2Ciν−i − µi,2
σ2m−1ii CiM−i,i
)
(A.14)
Since the network is complete, the third period announcement of each i ∈ N a normal distribution
with mean
µi,∞(n) =
σ2
n+ σ2µi,0 +
1
n+ σ2
n∑
j=0
sj(A.15)
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A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
To proof the proposition, we first define the notion coefficient of ergodicity as a measure for
ergodicity (Seneta, 1979).
Definition 8: Given a matrix G with entries gij, the coefficient of ergodicity ρ(G) defined on
the L1-norm of G is
(A.16) ρ(G) = 12
{
max
i,j
n∑
k=1
(|gik − gjk|)
}
,
with the following properties;
(i) 0 ≤ ρ(G) ≤ 1.
(ii) For two matrices G1 and G2, ρ(G1G2) ≤ ρ(G2)ρ(G2).
(iii) ρ(G) = 0 if and only if rank(G)=1; that is G = ev′
Let GT = ∏Tt=0Gγ(t), then property (ii) of Definition 2 implies that
(A.17) ρ(GT ) ≤ ρ(Gγ(T ))ρ(Gγ(T−1)) · · · ρ(Gγ(0))
Property (iii) together with Lemma 2 imply that ergodic Markov chains are those in which
(A.18) lim
T→∞
ρ(GT ) = 0
We can thus deduce from properties (ii) and (iii) of Definition 2, specially equations (A.17) and
(A.18) that a chain is ergodic if there exists a τ ≥ 0 such that for every time interval [t, t+ τ) there
exists a sequence of matrices {Gγ(t), · · · , Gγ(t+τ)}, for which the coefficient of ergodicity of their
product is less than unity. That is ρ(Gγ(t) · · ·Gγ(t+τ)) < 1. Matrices or a product of matrices for
which the coefficient of ergodicity is less than unity are known as scrambling matrices. The question
we then ask is, what switching strategy induces a sequence of networks whose product on intervals
of time result into scrambling matrices? The following lemmas establish the necessary conditions.
Lemma 3: Let G1 and G2 be two network induced transition matrices, and that both matrices are
aperiodic. If G1 is connected, then the products G1G2 and G2G1 are also connected and aperiodic.
Proof. Write G2in the form G2 = Diag(G2) + G′2, where Diag(G2) is a diagonal matrix whose
elements are the diagonal of G2, and G′2 is the residual G2 − Diag(G2). Since G2 is non-negative
then so is G′2. We thus have that
G2G1 = Diag(G2)G1 +G′2G1
Denote by g2ii and g1ij for 1 ≤ i ≤ n as the elements of Diag(G2) and G1 respectively. Then
Diag(G2)G1 =

g211g
1
11 · · · g211g11n
...
...
g2nng
1
n1 · · · g2nng1nn

Clearly if G1 is connected and aperiodic, then so is Diag(G2)G1. The matrix product is non-negative
since G1 is also non-negative, such that when added to Diag(G2)G1 the properties of connectedness
aperiodicity are preserved. A similar argument follows for G1G2.
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Lemma 4: Let {Gγ(t)}t≥0 be a sequence of connected aperiodic transition matrices, then there
exists a sufficiently large τ > 0 such that
Gτ = Gγ(t) · · ·Gγ(t+τ)
is a scrambling matrix.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that a network that is connected and aperiodic induces a
primitive transition matrix. That is let G be such a matrix, then there exists a sufficiently large t
such that Gt is a positive matrix. Since positive stochastic matrices are scrambling, it follows that
the product of a sequence of connected aperiodic matrices is scrambling.
The following lemma then directly follows from the above two
Lemma 5: Let T2 < T1 < T be sufficiently large integers. If γ is such that there exist a T2 ≥ 0
and T1 ≥ 0 where by for every time interval [t, t+ T2) a connected communication network obtains,
such that within the time interval [t, t+ T1) a scrambling connected network obtains, then
lim
T→∞
T∏
t=0
Gγ(t) = ev′
The expression on the right hand side of (10) then follows directly from Lemma 5
A.3. Proof of Theorem 1
The general assumption in all the proofs below is that the sequence {G(n)}n≥2 is common
knowledge
(i) There are two parts to the proof of Theorem 1 (i); when the prior beliefs are observable and
when they are not. We first prove for the case in which the realized prior beliefs are observable,
that is for all i ∈ N , each µj,0 for all j ∈ Ni,1 is observable to i. Under this assumption, the
public belief of each i is normally distributed with mean
µi,∞(n) =
σ2
n+ σ2µi,0 +
1
n+ σ2
n∑
j=0
sj(A.19)
The variance of µi,∞(n) is then
var[µi,∞(n)] =
σ4η2
(n+ σ2)2
+ nσ
2
(n+ σ2)2
From Chernoff bound, it follows that
lim
n→∞P (|µi,∞(n)− µ¯| > )) ≤ limn→∞
(var[µi,∞(n)]

)
= lim
n→∞
(
σ4η2
(n+ σ2)2
+ nσ
2
(n+ σ2)2
)
= 0
(A.20)
It is easy to see that the right hand side of (A.20) will be zero if and only if both σ and η are
finite such that σ4η2 <∞. This conditions applies to all i ∈ N
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The limit of the variance of X is
lim
n→∞ vari,∞(n) = limn→∞
σ2
n+ σ2 = 0.
Now we prove for the case in which the realized priors are unobservable. From Proposition
1, if for each i ∈ N , µj,0 for all j ∈ Ni,1 are unobservable but it is common knowledge that
µ0 ∼ N (ν, η2I), where µ0 is a column vector of all µi,0, then the public belief of each i is
normally distributed with mean
µi,∞(n) =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1µi,1 +
1
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1
∑
l∈N\{i}
Ei[sl|ν]
(A.21)
For the sake of notational convenience, let ϕ =
(
1 + σ2
) (
1 + η2σ2
)
, and recall that Ei[sl|ν] =
σ2 (µl,0 − νl) + sl for all i ∈ N and all l ∈ N \ {i}. We can then rewrite (A.21) as
µi,∞(n) =
ϕ
ϕ+ n− 1µi,1 +
σ2
ϕ+ n− 1
∑
l∈N\{i}
(µl,0 − νl) + 1
ϕ+ n− 1
∑
l∈N\{i}
sl(A.22)
The variance associated with µi,∞(n) in (A.22) is
var[µi,∞(n)] =
ϕ2σ4η2 + ϕ2σ2
(ϕ+ n− 1)2(1 + σ2)2 +
σ4η2
(ϕ+ n− 1)2 +
(n− 1)σ2
(ϕ+ n− 1)2(A.23)
Similarly from (A.23), the limn→∞ var[µi,∞(n)] = 0 if and only if η and σ are finite. Note that
the sequence of random variables {(µl,0 − νl)}l∈N\{i} is of mean zero and variance η2. This
implies that if each term in the sum on the right hand side of (A.22) converges in probability,
then the first and the second term both converge to zero and the third term converges to µ¯.
It then follows from (A.20) that µi,∞(n)
p−→ µ¯.
If η and σ are finite, then limit of the variance of X when priors beliefs are not observable is
lim
n→∞
σ2
(
1 + η2σ2
)
(1 + σ2) (1 + η2σ2) + n− 1 = 0.
(ii) From (A.20) it follows that when the conditions of Theorem 1 (ii) are satisfied, µi,∞(n)
p−→ µ¯.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2
(i) Consider the case in which G(n) is doubly stochastic such that ∑nj=1 gij(n) = ∑ni=1 gij(n).
Let z and y be the left and right eigenvalues of G(n) associated with the leading eigenvalue.
If G(n) is doubly stochastic then z = y, such that
z′G(n) = z′ and G(n)z = z
Without loss of generality we can assume that ‖z‖ = z′z = 1. Specifically, z = 1√
N
e, where e
is a length n vector of ones. From Lemma 2 it follows that v = 1ne, such that for each i ∈ N
µi,∞(n) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
µi,1
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(ii) Recall that
µi,∞(n) =
n∑
j=1
vj(n)
(
σ2
1 + σ2µj,0 +
1
1 + σ2 sj
)
= 11 + σ2 µ¯+
σ2
1 + σ2
n∑
j=1
vj(n)µj,0 +
σ2
1 + σ2
n∑
j=1
vj(n)εj(A.24)
where the second equality follows from the fact that sj = µ¯+ εj and that
∑n
j=1 vj(n) = 1. Let
the summation components on the right hand side of A.24 be denoted as follows
Vµ(n) =
n∑
j=1
vj(n)µj,0, and Vε(n) =
n∑
j=1
vj(n)εj .
Since µ¯ is a parameter, it follows that any variance in µi,∞(n) is due to the variances in Vµ(n)
and Vε(n). This in turn implies that for µi,∞(n) to converge in probability, then both Vµ(n)
and Vε(n) must also converge in probability to their respective limits. Consider first the in
which the communication network is balanced, in which case (A.24) becomes.
µi,∞(n) =
1
1 + σ2 µ¯+
σ2
1 + σ2
1
n
n∑
j=1
µj,0 +
σ2
1 + σ2
1
n
n∑
j=1
εj(A.25)
This implies that both Vµ(n) and Vε(n) are simply sample averages of the random variables
µi,0 and εi of all i ∈ N respectively. It then follows from the law of large numbers that Vε(n)
converge in probability to zero, and Vµ(n) converges in probability to µ¯ only if µ0 ∼ N (µ¯, η2I).
This in turn implies that µi,∞(n) also converges in probability to µ¯. That is
µi,∞(∞) = 11 + σ2 µ¯+
σ2
1 + σ2 µ¯ = µ¯(A.26)
Generally speaking, both Vµ(n) and Vε(n) are sample weighted averages of n random variable
µi,0 and εi respectively drawn with probabilities vi(n) for each i ∈ N , from normal distributions
with means µ¯ and zero variance. These sample means converge in probability if and only if
their variances converge to zero for large n. That is
lim
n→∞ var[Vµ(n)] = 0 and limn→∞ var[Vε(n)] = 0
The respective variances are
var[Vµ(n)] = η2
n∑
j=1
v2j (n) and var[Vε(n)] = σ2
n∑
j=1
v2j (n),
which converge to zero if and only if the summand ∑nj=1 v2j (n) converges to zero with n. This
sum converges to zero if each square v2j (n) converges to zero with large n. In fact it is enough to
say that maxi∈N (vi(n))→ 0 for large n. This condition is satisfied by asymptotically balanced
networks in that if G(n) is asymptotically balanced, then G(n) converges to doubly stochastic
matrix S. Where for any doubly stochastic matrix, the elements of the corresponding weight
vector vi(n) = 1n , converge to zero for large n.
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In the case of the variance of public belief, it follows directly that
vari,∞(n) =
n∑
j=1
vj(n)
σ
1 + σ
= σ1 + σ
n∑
j=1
vj(n) =
σ
1 + σ(A.27)
A.5. Proof of Proposition 3
Given G(n), the closest doubly stochastic matrix S(n) to G(n) is that which minimizes the
quantity ‖S(n)−G(n)‖2F . Our objective is then as follows:
minS(n)∈S(n) ‖S(n)−G(n)‖2F
subject to S(n)z = z z′S(n) = z′
where S(n) is the set of all doubly stochastic matrices of size n, and z is the left and right eigenvectors
corresponding to the first (unit) eigenvalue of S(n). We assume without loss of generality that
‖z‖ = z′z = 1. The elements of G(n) are denoted by gij(n) and those for S(n) by sij . It is easy to
see that the objective function to be minimized is of the form
f(G(n)) = (s11 − g11)2 + · · ·+ (s1n − g1n)2 + · · ·+ (sn1 − gn1)2 + · · ·+ (snn − gnn)2
Note that the constraints together make a total of 2n linear equations, which leads to 2n Lagrange
multipliers denoted (in vector form) by 2α = (2α1, · · · , 2αn) and 2β = (2β1, · · · , 2βn). Note also
that the factor of 2 in α and β is to account for the factor of 2 in the derivative of f(G(n)) below.
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions yield the following matrix equation.
(A.28) (S(n)−G(n)) + αz′ + zβ′ = 0
By substituting for S(n) = G(n) − αz′ − zβ′ into S(n)z = z and z′S(n) = z′, together with the
assumption that z′z = 1, one obtains the following set of simultaneous equations.
(A.29) G(n)z− α− zβ′z = z
(A.30) z′G(n)− z′αz′ − β′ = z′,
which can be written in matrix form as
(A.31)
 I zz′
zz′ I
α
β
 =
G(n)z− z
G(n)′z− z

We can then solve for α and β by multiplying both sides of (A.31) by the inverse of
 I zz′
zz′ I
.
That is
(A.32)
I 0
0 I
α
β
 = 11− zz′
 I −zz′
−zz′ I
G(n)z− z
G′(n)z− z

33
which yields,
α = G(n)z− z and β = G′(n)z− z
The assumption that z′z = 1 also implies that z = 1√
n
e. Substituting for α and β in (A.28) and
noting that G(n)e = e, we obtain
(A.33) S(n) = G(n) + 1
n
ee′ − 1
n
ee′G(n)
It then follows that
φ(n)2 = ‖S(n)−G(n)‖2F =
1
n2
‖ee′ − ee′G(n)‖2F
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
1−
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
.(A.34)
A.6. Proof of Theorem 3
The proof follows from Proposition 3, where a network is said to be asymptotically balanced if
lim
n→∞φ(n) = 0.
For Theorem 3 (i), we have that
φ2(n) = 1
n
n∑
j=1
(
1−
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
= 1
n
n∑
j=1
1− 2 n∑
i=1
gij(n) +
(
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
= 1
n
n− 2 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gij(n) +
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
gij(n)
)2
≤ 1
n
dinmax(n)
 n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
gij(n)
− n

= dinmax(n)− 1(A.35)
such that limn→∞ φ(n) = 0 if limn→∞ dinmax(n) = 1.
For the case of Theorem 3 (ii), since for n > n′ the quantity D(n) is constant say c, then for all
n > n′
φ2(n) = 1
n
c
In which case limn→∞ 1nc = 0.
A.7. Proof of Proposition 4
Under Bayesian rational learning, the proof follows directly from the fact that learning stops
after the two agents that form the longest geodesic (diameter of the network) have communicated
their private informations (see proof of Proposition 1). The time it takes private beliefs to become
public is thus tc = D(Gγc), in which case the convergence rate is basically 1tc . The relationship
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between the diameter and the second largest eigenvalue of a graph is a well studied concept in
graph theory (e.g Chung (1989)). Generally it assumes the form,
D(Gγc) ≤
ln(c)
ln(1/λ2(Gγc))
where c is some constant.
In the case of Bayesian bounded-rational learning mechanism, it is well known that a homoge-
neous Markov chain with transition matrix Gγc whose second largest eigenvalue is λ2(Gγc) converges
at the equal to λ2(Gγc). We write λi for λi(Gγc) for the sake of notational cumbersomeness. Let
zi and yi be the right and left eigenvectors associated with the eigenvalue λi, and let λi in ordered
as λ1 > λ2 ≥ · · · . Then the above argument follows from the eigendecomposition of Gγc (assuming
that Gγc is connected such that λ2(Gγc) < 1, and that Gγc is actually eigendecomposable), where
the convergence rate is defined precisely as,
rBBR = lim
t→∞ ‖G
t
γcµ1 − µ¯‖
1
t
= lim
t→∞ ‖
(
z1y1′µ1 − µ¯
)
+
n∑
i=2
λtiziyi′µ1‖
1
t
= |λ2| lim
t→∞ ‖z2y2
′µ1 +
n∑
i=3
(
λi
λ2
)t
ziyi′µ1‖
1
t = |λ2|(A.36)
A.8. Proof of Proposition 5
First consider the case of Bayesian rational learning mechanism where
(A.37) Uit(a∗it(n), X) = −
1
δt
Ei,t
[
(µi,t(n)−X)2
]
= − 1
δt
vari,t(n)
For a given δ and n, Uit(a∗it(n), X) is a non-monotone function of time. The variance vari,t(n) a
generally non-increasing function of time for a given n, and 1δt is an increasing function of time.
Note that the time until the learning process ends under Bayesian ration learning is equal to the
diameter D(G(n)) of the network. This implies that for a given δ and n, there exists a positive
integer ti,e such that at t = ti,e ≤ D(G(n)), Uit(a∗it(n), X) is minimum. The time t = ti,e is the
optimal exit time for agent i and it generally depends on i’s position in the network.
The exit time can be ordered with respect to D(G(n)) for groups of agents. Let Q(G(n)) be a
set of agents in G(n) whose optimal exit time is less than the diameter of the graph. That is
Q(G(n)) = {i ∈ N : ti,e < D(G(n))}
and let #Q(G(n)) denote the respective cardinality. Then for two networks G1(n) and G2(n) such
that G1(n) > G2(n), then it must be Q(G1(n)) ≥ Q(G2(n))
Lemma 6: Given a sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2 and the corresponding sequence {Q(G(n))}n≥2,
correct asymptotic learning obtains if and only if
(A.38) lim
n→∞#Q(G(n)) = 0
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If condition (A.38) is not fulfilled then even for a large n there exists a finite number of agents
who exit the game after receiving signals only from a finite number of other agents. Lemma 6 can
be proved by contradiction.
Consider the contrary case in which limn→∞Q(G(n)) = Qe, that is Qe is a set of agents that
exited the game after receiving the private information of a finite number of other agents. Denote
by ai,e for the corresponding action taken by an agent i ∈ Qe at the end of the learning process,
and by ni,e as the number of agents whose signals i received before exiting the game. Let ne =
maxi∈Qe{ni,e}. The above definitions and notations imply that
ai,e(n) = lim
n→∞ ai,t(n) = µi,∞(n)
such that the variance of ai,e(n) is
var[ai,e(n)] ≡ var[µi,∞(n)]
Given the sequence of networks {G(n)}n≥2, then for an agent i ∈ Qe for whom ni,e = ne, we have
lim
n→∞ var[ai,e(n)] = var[µi,∞(∞)]
= var
 σ2
ne + σ2
µi,0 +
1
ne + σ2
ne∑
j=0
sj

= σ
4η2 + neσ2
(ne + σ2)2
(A.39)
From Chernoff bound, it follows that
lim
n→∞ limt→∞P (|ai,t(n)− µ¯| > ) > limn→∞ limt→∞
(
1− var[ai,t(n)]

)
= 1− σ
4η2 + neσ2
(ne + σ2)2
> 0(A.40)
In which case limn→∞ limt→∞ ai,t(n) 6= µ¯. If this is true for an agent i ∈ Qe for whom ni,e = ne,
and from the fact that for all i ∈ Qe ni,e ≤ ne, then (A.40) must be true for all i ∈ Qe.
Lemma 7: Condition (A.38) in Lemma 6 is satisfied if and only if for a sequence {G(n)}n≥2 of
networks and the corresponding sequence {D(G(n))}n≥2
(A.41) lim
n→∞
1
n
D(G(n)) = 0
The proof of Lemma 7 follows directly from the argument that for a sequence {G(n)}n≥2, if by
contradiction the corresponding sequence {D(G(n))}n≥2 is such that D(G(2)) < D(G(2)) < · · · ,
then similarly for the sequence {Q(G(n))}n≥2 it must be that Q(G(2)) ≤ Q(G(2)) ≤ · · · with at
least one strict inequality. In which case condition (A.38) in Lemma 6 will not be fulfilled.
In the case of bounded-rational learning, the variance of X is constant over time and n, which
implies that the “discounted” expected loss is non-increasing, unlike the the case of rational learning
in which it is non-monotonic in nature. Agents therefore do not have any incentive to wait until
longer before taking an action a ∈ A. That is limn→∞ limt→∞ ai,t(n) = µ¯ can occur only if the
network is complete, such that agents do not have to wait for more than one or two periods before
taking an action in A.
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